Celebrity culture and public connection: bridge or chasm? by Couldry, Nick & Markham, Tim
  
Nick Couldry and Tim Markham 
Celebrity culture and public connection: 
bridge or chasm? 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: 
Couldry, Nick and Markham, Tim (2007) Celebrity culture and public connection: bridge or 
chasm? International journal of cultural studies, 10 (4), pp. 403-421. 
 
DOI: 10.1177/1367877907083077 
 
© 2007 SAGE Publications Ltd 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/52412/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: September 2013 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 1
CELEBRITY CULTURE AND PUBLIC CONNECTION: 
BRIDGE OR CHASM? 
 
Nick Couldry 
Goldsmiths, University of London 
and 
Tim Markham 
Birkbeck College, University of London 
Revised version submitted to International Journal of Cultural Studies 17 April 2007  
 
 
Contact details for first author: 
Department of Media and Communications 
Goldsmiths, University of London 
New Cross 
London SE14 6NW 
n.couldry@gold.ac.uk 
 2
CELEBRITY CULTURE AND PUBLIC CONNECTION: 
BRIDGE OR CHASM? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Media and cultural research has an important contribution to make to recent debates 
about declines in democratic engagement: is for example celebrity culture a route into 
democratic engagement for those otherwise disengaged? This article contributes to this 
debate by reviewing qualitative and quantitative findings from a UK project on 'public 
connection'. Using self-produced diaries (with in-depth multiple interviews) as well as a 
nationwide survey, the authors argue that while celebrity culture is an important point of 
social connection sustained by media use, it is not linked in citizens' own accounts to 
issues of public concern. Survey data suggest that those who particularly follow celebrity 
culture are the least engaged in politics and least likely to use their social networks to 
involve themselves in action or discussion about public-type issues. This does not mean 
'celebrity culture' is 'bad', but it challenges suggestions of how popular culture might 
contribute to effective democracy. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Democratic engagement; celebrity culture; popular culture; diaries; public 
connection 
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Introduction 
 
This is an age of declining participation in the electoral process in many countries, 
notably the USA, UK and Japan (Sussman 2005: 162) and declining institutional 
legitimacy1 across most established democracies. It is characterized also by the increasing 
pluralization and segregation of lifeworlds, and transformations in our sense of what 
‘politics’ and ‘public’ life should be, and where and by whom they should be conducted. 
It is marked finally by transformations in media: the forms through which media reach us 
and the habits by which we absorb media in our daily lives, leading to an intensified 
fragmentation of audiences. Slower long-term trends therefore intersect with fast-moving 
developments, making it particularly difficult to see what exactly is changing. As a result, 
there has been much debate in political science about whether falling voter turnout and 
political trust signifies a turning of populations away from politics or in fact a 
reorientation of politics and a relocation of political action (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; 
Tarrow, 2000). Similarly, within media and cultural studies, there has been intense debate 
between those who fear an absolute decline in politics as a transformative force (Gitlin, 
1998; Giroux, 2001) and those who argue that politics is being renewed and further 
democratized by popular culture (Corner & Pels, 2003b; Zoonen, 2005)  
 
In this ongoing debate, celebrity culture is of particular interest. Celebrity itself has 
attracted a growing literature which is split on its benefits and costs. Celebrities, we are 
often told, are role-models for millions, especially younger citizens; the detailed 
narratives of celebrity lives – their struggles over identity, sexuality, giving birth, 
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performing in public – certainly fascinate many of us. And celebrities are increasingly 
involved in, and used by politicians to further, political narratives, as part of a general 
blurring of the boundary between news and entertainment (Delli Carpini & Williams, 
2001). From here, some have made a stronger case, that celebrity culture is an essential 
component of public debate about the issues which require public resolution, whether as 
part of an increasing personalization of politics (Corner & Pels, 2003b), or as part of a 
broader narrativisation of democracy that includes a wider section of the public (Hartley, 
1999; Lumby, 1997). This contradicts a longer negative tradition which sees celebrities 
and the mediated events constructed around them, as pseudo-personalities and pseudo-
events (Boorstin, 1961). But such is the proliferation of celebrity culture (Rojek, 2001; 
Turner, 2004) that it can no longer simply be dismissed as external to the world of public 
issues.  
 
When thinking about the wider relationship of celebrity culture to political engagement 
and political culture, there are two possible approaches: one is to look more specifically 
at how the figure of celebrity is specifically mobilized in contemporary mediated politics. 
The other, which we will take, is to consider how celebrity culture in a broader sense (as 
it intersects with the growth of ‘reality TV’, fashion culture and other areas of today’s 
media cultures) offers connections to a world of public and political issues, even if one 
very different from traditional party politics. From this latter perspective, it is interesting 
that some political sociologists have seen in the growth of reality TV (so successful in 
mobilizing significant proportions of at least the younger population in many countries) a 
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possible alternative route to engaging those otherwise irreversibly switched off from 
politics (Coleman, 2003; Power, 2006: 247-48). 
 
In this article we aim to contribute to these debates by drawing on the findings of a recent 
research project (Couldry, Livingstone and Markham 2007), both its qualitative and 
quantitative data.2 This, we argue, supports a skeptical approach to claims that celebrity 
culture, in the broader sense just mentioned, contributes positively to the possibilities of 
democratic renewal, at least in the UK. This has considerable implications, we will 
suggest, for our understanding of the relationship between popular culture and politics. 
 
The Public Connection project: some background  
 
Our research question in the ‘Public Connection’ project3 is best explained in terms of 
two connected and widely made assumptions about democratic politics that we have been 
trying to ‘test’: first, in an established democracy such as Britain, that most people share 
an orientation to a public world where matters of common concern are, or at least should 
be, addressed (we call this orientation ‘public connection’), and  second, that this public 
connection is focussed principally on mediated versions of that public world (so that 
‘public connection’ is principally sustained by a convergence in what media people 
consume, in other words, by shared or overlapping shared media consumption). 
 
The word ‘public’ is, of course, notoriously difficult, since it has a range of conflicting 
meanings (Weintraub and Kumar, 1997), with two related types of boundary in particular 
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overlapping: the boundary between public and private space (a boundary which turns on 
the question of what is publicly accessible) and the boundary between public and private 
issues (which turns on what types of issue need, or do not need, to be resolved 
collectively). In our research, we have been primarily interested in the second type of 
boundary. Our working assumption has been that the public/private boundary in this 
sense remains meaningful in spite of many other levels of disagreement over the content 
and definition of politics. There is no space to defend this working assumption,4 but we 
would suggest that even political theory that emphasises the fluidity and multivalence of 
the public/private boundary still ends up by reaffirming its significance  (for example 
Geuss, 2001).To summarise, when in this project we talk of ‘public’ connection, we 
mean by ‘public’ things or issues regarded as of shared concern, not purely private 
concern, matters that in principle citizens need to discuss in a world of limited resources 
(cf Taylor 2004). Our understanding of the public/private boundary has not however been 
prescriptive. The point of our research has been to ask people: what makes up their public 
world? How are they connected to that world? And how are media involved, or not, in 
sustaining that connection to a public world (as they understand it)?  
 
These are the questions we aimed to explore: first by asking a small group of 37 people to 
produce a diary for 3 months during 2004 that reflected on those questions; second by 
interviewing those diarists, both before and after their diary production, individually and 
in some cases also in focus-groups; and finally by broadening out the themes from this 
necessarily small group to a nationwide survey (conducted in June 2005 on our behalf by 
ICM Research, with a sample of 1017 respondents). The survey provided data on media 
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consumption, attitudes to media and politics, and public actions, and also the contexts in 
which all of these occur. 
 
Our 37 diarists were evenly split across gender and three age categories (between 18 and 
69). We aimed indirectly for a wide socioeconomic range through two strategies: first, by 
recruiting in 6 contrasting regions (poor inner city London, mid-income suburban 
London, poor inner city South of England, prosperous suburbs of two Northern England 
cities, and a mixed-income rural area in the Midlands); and, second, through recruiting 
people with varying levels of media access in each region. As a result, we achieved a 
broad span from single mothers living on limited incomes in London public housing to 
retired financial services executives. Men aged between 30 and 50 were difficult to 
recruit as were both genders in Class D (unskilled manual labour), but we achieved a 
good range of home media access (broadly tracking then current UK national averages). 
There were nine non-white diarists, an over-representation demographically but 
important to ensure a range of views in relation to Britain’s overwhelmingly white 
political culture. 
 
The diaries were produced weekly for up to three months. We encouraged open reflection 
and avoided specific signals as to what people were to comment on. Crucial to our 
method was combining self-produced data – tracing respondents’ own reflections as they 
developed under the pressures of everyday life and alongside changing public events – 
and semi-structured interviews, conducted not just in advance of the diaries but after their 
completion, when the diarists could be invited to reflect on the accuracy and meaning of 
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their reflections. Our idea, against the grain of so much political science that is 
exclusively based on dominated by survey methodology, was that we needed to listen to 
respondents’ own voices produced and recorded in their own time, if we were to get a 
sense of what it ‘feels like’ to be a citizen in contemporary Britain, or not, as the case 
may be.5 Nonetheless, as we shall see, our nationwide survey produced very useful 
findings also about the salience of celebrity culture to political engagement across the 
wider population.  
 
An Expanded Public World 
 
The whole point of our research was to avoid imposing a narrow view of the public world 
(particularly one focused on a usually gendered perspective on traditional politics) and 
allow for a wide range of approaches to what count as public issues. As a result, our diary 
research registered some people’s interest in traditional politics, but registered many 
other perspectives as well on public issues and on the world presented by media. There 
was considerable commentary on celebrity culture, reality TV and (to a lesser extent) 
music and fashion. We took an open view on the relationship of celebrity culture to 
public connection: we asked our diarists to talk, as they thought relevant, about celebrity 
and other aspects of popular media culture, and then looked for any connections they 
made with issues of public contention.  
 
Overall attitudes to celebrity culture 
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There was a clear group of diarists, generally younger and female, for whom celebrity 
culture in a broad sense was central to the media they followed and to which they felt 
connected. In what follows, we quote a number of examples to illustrate the importance 
of engagement with celebrity culture amongst our diarists: 
 
Yeah, that’s it you know, everyone, I enjoy reading gossipy stories. Everyone enjoys 
reading gossipy stories (Andrea, 25, childrens’ nurse, rural English midlands) 
 
I would say that I do keep up to date with what's going on. Maybe mainly the gossipy 
side of the media, you know like Heat and OK magazine, yes I get those every week. 
So I tend to keep up with who’s doing what with who and where and what have you. 
What girl isn’t into that really? (Janet, 29, airport operations manager, suburb of 
northern English city) 
 
Beccy’s engagement was tinged however with defensiveness:  
 
The public  . . . are always gonna want to know more and the public are going to buy 
Heat magazine no matter what trash is in it because you know you just get fed the stuff 
and you just take it in . . . It is the whole car crash thing. It’s compelling and . . . I 
don’t know why. (Beccy, 27, marketing executive, suburb of northern English city) 
 
Later Beccy explained her love of celebrity, soaps and reality TV through a pragmatic 
individualism: 
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I’m looking at Posh and Becks and really not looking at politics  . . . I’m as guilty as 
the next person for doing it.  There’s the sort of right way of going about things and 
there’s the actual way you sort of do things. You know in a real life situation when 
you’re busy at work and you know you’ve got pressures or you know you get stresses 
and you come home and you know just end up watching like trash telly which is what 
I was doing when you came in, just to chill out. (Beccy) 
 
In spite of such occasional defensiveness, for many diarists celebrities were part of a 
collective world to which media connected them. This is potentially distinct from a 
‘public’ world in the sense we mean by the term ‘public connection’ (that is, a world of 
public issues for collective resolution).  
 
It is important however also to register diarists by whom celebrity culture in the broad 
sense (in which we will include for convenience the quasi-celebrity culture of reality 
TV)6  was seen as negative: ‘to me it’s pure voyeurism  . . .  there’s nothing happening’ 
(Stuart, 61, retired bank manager, suburb of northern English city); ‘I mean, these last 
two weeks, Jordan has been front page. Who is interested in that?’ (Pavarti, 51, shop 
owner, suburban west London). As a result, for some people celebrity stories were 
something they needed to escape from, rather than felt attracted to:  
 
Have avoided newspapers, because as I predicted they are full of the Beckhams and 
real news is taking a back seat! (Abby, 45, administrative officer, inner south London) 
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A very quiet Easter, have not really read the paper, mind you there was only the 
Beckhams, and the Beckhams’ hangers on in the world this weekend, I am so sick of 
them I want to throw up, I have deliberately not read anything about them, but I’m 
sure you will understand!! (Christine, 46, events coordinator, suburb of northern 
English city) 
 
While women were particularly vociferous on this topic (perhaps they sensed that aspects 
of celebrity culture were particularly addressed at them), there were men who also felt a 
distance from celebrity culture. Men were more likely to develop this into a negative 
judgment about others: 
 
What I find quite astonishing really that most people I know really just don’t care 
about what’s going on. They’re focused on their own thing and as long as they know 
that David Beckham’s had a new hair cut and that they can go and get it done at the 
salon just like this . . . and they just carry on with stuff. I don’t care what David 
Beckman’s hair looks like. (Josh, 23, architecture student, suburb of northern English 
city) 
 
Some diarists were ambivalent on the wider relevance of celebrity stories, acknowledging 
the pleasure they offered, but uneasy about their predominance. Crystal for example was 
22, an unemployed single mother from inner city South London. She acknowledged that 
celebrities might sometimes be positive points of references: ‘I love the Beckhams, I 
really do love them’. ‘Sometimes’ she said ‘it makes you want to better yourself’. 
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However she felt two types of tension. The first was to do with the excessive demands of 
consumerism: ‘I wanna read the magazines and stuff like that - but I can’t have that at the 
moment, so . . .  [I’m going to] get on with reality, what I’ve got to do, budgeting’. The 
second tension was over the excessive amount of celebrity coverage: ‘sometimes it is an 
overload’. This linked to her sense that sometimes there were more important priorities in 
the news: 
 
I talk about Iraq with my partner, with my mum, sometimes, you know - but - you 
know, a lot of people around me are very materialistic and that’s just not on their 
minds.  . . . [I]  like to concentrate on reality - things - but a lot of people around me 
are more into their own lives than others that they never knew and are now getting 
killed 500,000 miles away. A lot of that, they don’t care about the war, but they just 
don’t make it a part of their lives. 
 
Finally, there were a number of diarists for whom celebrity narratives simply did not 
feature at all, unless it was to dismiss them from a distance: 
 
I mean these celebrity programmes where you’re exposing people, is it really a 
good thing to watch somebody eat maggots? I mean I don’t particularly consider 
that entertainment you know.  (Edward) 
 
For a diarist such as Enid (63, part-time assistant at school, suburban west London), 
celebrity themes were not even raised for the purpose of critique. Enid was a heavy news 
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consumer whose diaries covered a variety of local, national and international topics, 
drawing on a range of media from TV and radio to the tabloid press. She simply filtered 
out what she thought was irrelevant to her, including celebrity issues. 
 
Our diarist sample therefore exhibited a wide range of attitudes to celebrity culture, with 
considerable ambivalence and sometimes hostility being found alongside attraction and 
engagement. The pilot research linked to our project (Couldry and Langer 2005) had 
found even greater ambivalence and hostility to celebrity culture among its respondents 
from the Mass-Observation panel – not surprisingly given their older average age.  
 
The picture that emerges is therefore considerably more complex than suggested by broad 
populist narratives about the implicit politics of celebrity culture. We want now to 
develop that insight in more detail by considering to what extent diarists themselves 
connected the discussion of celebrity narratives to public issues. 
 
Celebrity and public issues 
  
Celebrity culture can, of course, be discussed entirely in its own terms, with individual 
stories recycling themselves in myriad forms, or being linked to the stories of other 
celebrities in the narrative flow of magazine, press TV and internet coverage. However, a 
number of writers, as already noted, see celebrity culture had a wider significance than 
this, that is, a role in engaging the otherwise disengaged into a wider field of public 
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debate and concern. It was this we were interested in exploring amongst our diarists’ own 
accounts. 
 
The starting-point is everyday talk: talk about celebrity is a ready-made ‘social’ topic in 
certain settings as in the office lunch break:  
 
I mean we’ll have conversations and it is always based on the newspaper.  . . . Or 
perhaps I’ll bring in my Heat magazine and one of the lads will pick it up and be like 
‘Whoah that's Kylie Minogue’ and it will branch off into ‘Oh look she’s getting 
married’. (Janet) 
 
For Beccy, as her diary made clear, surfing celebrity websites was the regular way of 
spending the lunch hour: 
  
At lunchtime, [female name] (the other half of the marketing team) and I did some 
web surfing to catch up on the news.  We like anything light-hearted and diverting to 
entertain us, especially when we’re so busy. I was checking out Courtney Love’s latest 
adventures on nme.com, and she was checking out Ananova for celebrity gossip. 
Apparently Roseanne has had her stomach stapled.  Ananova is just a comic, it’s great. 
I don’t look at it because I don’t need to  [name of female colleague] tells me anything 
interesting that’s on there.  That’s mostly what we discuss in here, celebrity gossip, 
who was wearing what, who has said what, who’s done what.  We haven’t talked 
about the budget or anything serious (diary).   
 15
 
The boundary drawn here between celebrity culture (as a lightener of the social 
atmosphere) and ‘serious’ public issues is here very clear but not, in itself, evidence that 
celebrity culture disconnects people in any way from those other issues. Of course 
celebrity is something it can be entertaining to talk about in itself – part of Paddy 
Scannell called the ‘merely talkable about’ (Scannell, 1989). 
 
But was there evidence in what diarists wrote or said of them making links from celebrity 
narratives to public issues (as they understood them)? A few celebrity stories raised moral 
comment: 
 
Stories read and TV interviews seen with George Michael, and how thoughtful of 
him to donate all future money he makes to charity.  More famous people should 
follow him – after all the money that they make surely there is only so much that 
the need to live their very comfortable lives after years in the business. (Andrea, 
diary) 
 
The comment here remains closed, not linked to any wider discussion; it was in any case 
only picked up by two diarists. There was much more discussion about the alleged sexual 
liaisons of David Beckham. These were very prominent in the British press (and also in 
other countries) during March and April 2004, around the same time of very disturbing 
revelations from the Iraq War (the Abu-Ghraib jail torture stories) and major concerns on 
the global security front (the Madrid bombing of March 2004). This coincidence - and the 
choices about relative news priorities it forced newspaper editors to make - elicited a lot 
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of comment (alongside other comments on the boundaries between private and public life 
in the case of celebrities). Commentary on the Beckham case (for example) regularly 
developed, not into discussions of any broader issues for public resolution raised by that 
case, but to the opposite, to criticisms of media news values and their implication that the 
Beckhams were of wider public importance. For example: 
 
Why do we (the public) need to know what the Beckhams do with their private lives? 
(Lesley, 39, secretary in education, rural English midlands) 
I don’t understand why the private life of the England Coach should have anything to 
do with anyone but him. Private business is just that – between him and his partner – 
and so what if it’s his secretary? (Josh, diary) 
 
Note here that it was diarists’ separation between celebrity culture and topics of public 
interest – not the connections between them – that is primary. Nor did discussion of 
celebrity, although frequent among our diarists, emerge elsewhere as a reference-point 
for broader debates that diarists themselves regarded as of wider public concern.7 The 
same, perhaps surprisingly, was more broadly true of reality TV, in spite of many 
diarists’ obvious pleasure in it.   
 
Surprising here is that celebrity culture even in diarists’ own accounts does not seem to 
connect with public issues in the broad sense which we were employing, that is, 
contentious issues that require to public resolution. We acknowledge one important 
cultural studies argument (Lumby 1997, van Zoonen 2005) that celebrity culture has 
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redefined what counts as public issues (in our broad sense). But, if that were the case, we 
would expect followers of celebrity culture (of whom we had many in our study) to talk 
about it and relate it to such an expanded notion of what counts as issues for public 
resolution. Yet, in our research at least, it was precisely such links that were missing.  Is 
then the ‘politics’ of celebrity culture in this sense an academic illusion? We want now to 
develop our argument by looking at what our survey told us about who tends to follow 
celebrity culture. 
 
Following celebrity culture and political disengagement  
 
The Public Connection survey was administered by telephone to a nationally 
representative, quota sample of the population of Great Britain (18+). Conducted during 
June 2005, this was a few months after we completed the diary research and, it turned 
out, a few weeks after national elections in which Tony Blair’s Labour Government 
narrowly won a third term in office. The survey questionnaire combined questions on 
public and political interest, knowledge and action with questions on media access, use 
and evaluation, so as to examine their interrelations. We will select drastically here from 
our survey results to focus on those aspects that provide insights into the status of 
celebrity culture.  
 
Respondents were asked, ‘which of the following things, if any, do you generally follow 
or keep up to date with?’, accompanied by a list of 18 possible ‘things’ (we deliberately 
did not label them ‘issues’ or ‘concerns’). This included ‘traditional’ political issues (e.g. 
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events in Westminster, crime and policing, etc) and life political or single issue politics 
(e.g. protecting the environment, religious questions, etc) and some broader themes in the 
public eye (including Big Brother, celebrity gossip, music, fashion). 
The answers were interesting. Most commonly, people keep up with the environment 
(70%), crime (67%), health (66%) and events in Iraq (63%). One in five (21%) named 
Big Brother or other reality television programmes, more than named trade union politics 
(17%). Men tend to follow Iraq, the UK economy, sports, Europe, international politics, 
Westminster politics and trade union politics more than women, who are more likely to 
follow issues relating to health, fashion, celebrity and reality television. Older people are 
more likely to follow the environment, crime, Iraq, third world poverty, the UK economy, 
funding for local services, local council politics, and Westminster politics. Younger 
people, on the other hand, are more likely to follow issues relating to fashion, celebrity, 
reality television and popular music. Issues also vary by class: 50% of middle class 
respondents follow international politics compared to 28% of working class respondents; 
middle class respondents are also more likely to follow issues relating to health, the UK 
economy, Europe and Westminster politics. 
 
A cluster analysis was carried out on respondents according to the issues they said they 
tended to follow.  The analysis identified four clusters into which each survey respondent 
could be classified, summarized in figure 1. Table 1 shows the top things each cluster 
said they they keep up with. 
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
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<Table 1 about here> 
 
The cluster analysis shows that, with the exception of those who do not tend to follow 
anything in particular, most people keep up with a common core of headline themes, such 
as health, crime, the environment and events in Iraq. The different groups are then 
defined by what they tend to follow beyond this core. The ‘traditional’ cluster is so 
labelled because their interests match those traditionally identified as ‘political’: this is 
the largest cluster, suggesting that many attempt to keep up with the mainstream political 
agenda, including the economy, the environment, crime, Iraq and Europe. A sizeable 
minority fall into the ‘issues’ cluster, for they keep up with a subset of the news agenda 
focused on specific, single issues: the economy and Europe drop out of their top five 
themes, and health and poverty take their place. A smaller minority (the ‘low interest’ 
cluster) professed little interest in any topic: when asked what they follow, 4 in 10 named 
only one thing, in strong contrast with the other clusters. The one in seven respondents 
who belong to the ‘celebrity’ cluster are distinctive in that, as well as the headline news 
of the day, they keep up with the latest celebrity gossip, fashion, the music charts and 
reality television. Let us now examine this last group in more detail. 
 
First, demographically, the celebrity cluster is by far the youngest of the four groups, 
with an average age of 32, compared with 43 for those who follow traditional political 
issues. Women outnumber men in the celebrity group by almost three to one. 
Interestingly, celebrity followers come from all socioeconomic levels: the proportion of 
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ABs in this group is in fact higher than it is for the single issue cluster, and only six 
percent lower than for the traditional group. There is also a higher than average 
proportion of unskilled manual workers, while skilled workers are slightly under-
represented. 
 
Celebrity followers are also a distinct group in terms of the uses to which they put their 
social capital. They are three times less likely (than the traditional cluster) to be involved 
in local organisations, and twice less likely to be involved in volunteer work. This is also 
reflected in their attitudes to local community: compared to the traditional group, they are 
10 percent less likely to believe that being involved locally is important, and 12 percent 
less likely to agree that they can influence decisions in their area. This is despite the fact 
that they are considerably more likely to have their friends living nearby, which suggests 
it may be explicable by attitudes to social discourse. That is, while the celebrity followers 
in general have a social network in which they are active, nearly half say they do not like 
to discuss politics, and only 49 percent say their friends would expect them to know 
what’s going on in the world (compared with 78 percent of traditional news followers). 
Celebrity followers, in other words, do not lack social capital (along the lines of Putnam’s 
Bowling Alone argument) but experience a diminished sense of social efficacy in 
comparison to the traditional group.   
 
<Tables 2, 3 and 4 about here> 
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What about politics? The survey reveals (Table 4) that the celebrity cluster is the least 
likely to vote and, perhaps unsurprisingly, only 40 percent say they are generally 
interested in what’s going on in politics (compared with 88 percent of the traditional 
cluster). When respondents were asked if they tended to avoid political protests, those 
who follow celebrity themes did not differ significantly from the overall average (60 
percent do not get involved), but when asked about their actions in relation to a specific 
theme they had mentioned in the survey as important to them (see Table 3), less than half 
had engaged in a public action, significantly lower than the two-thirds of traditional news 
followers who said they had acted in relation to the issue they named. 
 
This lack of active engagement is mirrored in attitudes towards politics amongst the 
celebrity cluster. More than two-thirds agree that ‘people like use have no say in what the 
government does’ (less than half of the traditional cluster agreed with the same question), 
while over half say that politics has little connection with their lives. Sixty percent say 
that it makes no difference which political party is in power, while a third say they do not 
have a good understanding of the main issues facing the country. Significantly, more than 
four fifths of the celebrity cluster agree that politics is sometimes too complicated to 
understand. Not only is this figure much higher than for the traditional cluster, it is also 
considerably greater than for the cluster who have little interest in following any issues 
(perhaps a sign of an earlier effort to follow politics that has failed). 
 
How can we relate these striking figures to the celebrity cluster’s broader engagement 
with media? It is certainly not the case that the celebrity cluster is ‘hyper-mediated’, 
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engaging intensely with entertainment-based media rather than other mediated or non-
mediated public worlds. Indeed, overall media consumption for the celebrity cluster is 
about average. However, disaggregating the various media variables included in the 
survey highlights some clear distinctions. First, the celebrity cluster watches significantly 
more television on a daily basis than any other cluster, and also spends more time on the 
internet for non-work-related purposes (related possibly to their younger age profile). 
They spend a little less time reading a newspaper than the overall, and are by a 
considerable margin the least likely to read books. 
 
Interestingly, however the celebrity cluster’s overall time spent following the news does 
not suggest a lack of overall engagement with media, with average levels watching 
television news (92 percent watch at least three times a week), listening to radio news (70 
percent) and reading a national newspaper (58 percent). However, if we look at quality of 
news engagement rather than quantity, some clear trends begin to emerge. Some 25 
percent fewer respondents in the celebrity cluster, compared with the traditional cluster, 
feel a sense of duty to keep up with what’s going on in the world – the same gap between 
the groups when asked if they compare different news sources (Table 5).  It is thus the 
lack of engagement with news, in parallel with the lack of local and political engagement, 
rather than lack of exposure to news (because of reasons such as time-lack), which marks 
the celebrity cluster as distinct. 
 
<Table 5 about here> 
 
 23
It bears emphasising that celebrity culture is a minority cluster: they do not therefore tell 
us about the consequences of consuming celebrity culture across the wider population. 
They do however tell us something important about what features are likely to be 
associated with a primary interest in celebrity culture. Respondents in this cluster are the 
least likely to vote, their political interest is low, as is their social efficacy. They spend an 
average amount of time with the media in general and the news in particular, although 
their disposable leisure time is the lowest (again, perhaps because of the predominance of 
women). What makes them distinctive is their low news engagement, a lack of 
engagement which is mirrored in the local and political arenas: seen positively, they 
prioritise ‘keeping up to date with’ celebrity and popular culture over both traditional or 
alternative public issues.  
It is indeed important to see these trends as a positive choice: the ‘celebrity’ cluster is 
quite distinct from the low interest cluster in this respect. While as many as 49%  of the 
low interest cluster say ‘the things media cover have little to do with my life’, the 
celebrity cluster is similar to other clusters on this measure, and are also the least likely to 
say there is too much media (Table 5). The question is what are the implications of this 
positive choice.  
We were aware of the need to handle carefully the distinction between traditional and 
non-traditional news categories in our survey methodology, because of the risk that 
building in such a distinction might pre-determine the finding of such a separation in the 
data. We addressed this by labelling categories in the survey by specific interests rather 
than by normative groupings, and instructing data collectors to shuffle the topic order so 
as to give no overall priority to any theme. Instead of asking respondents, for example, if 
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they followed ‘traditional’ news themes, 18 topics were prompted without pre-
determined emphasis or ordering. A factor analysis was subsequently applied to group 
interests most often named together, and only then did we (tentatively) apply the labels of 
‘traditional’, ‘issues’ and ‘celebrity’ to these groups. This is in line with a key aim of the 
diary phase of the project not to pre-empt respondents’ views on what (if anything) 
constitutes a public issue to them. 
 
Conclusion 
We have tried in this article to take a more nuanced look at how celebrity culture (in a 
broad sense) features in how people make sense of the world, and in particular the public 
world, as presented to them through their media consumption. Drawing on both 
qualitative and quantitative data, we have argued that, instead of relying on presumptions 
about the resonance of celebrity narratives for whole populations, it is essential to 
develop more specific arguments based on detailed evidence. No general claims are 
possible about celebrity culture’s positive relevance to people’s public connection: some 
people feel very negative about it, whereas for others it is a site of connection with a 
wider audience. Even in the latter case, there were few, if any, cases where people 
themselves linked celebrity narratives to what they defined as public issues of any sort. 
Indeed where media’s presentation of celebrity lives did lead to discussion, it was most 
likely to be a commentary on how irrelevant they were to genuine public issues, so 
reaffirming, not redrawing, the public/private boundary. 
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It is also important, as our survey data brought out, to be demographically precise about 
who we mean, when we talk about those with an affinity for celebrity culture. The 
conclusions are not necessarily encouraging. Those who followed celebrity culture were 
those least likely to be politically engaged. This is of course not surprising, and certainly 
linked to the gendering of political culture itself of course an important and socially 
regressive factor. Indeed, all the evidence suggests that following celebrity culture 
represents a positive choice by this group, distinguishing them from the low interest 
cluster. Our argument is not, however, that there is anything ‘wrong’ with this choice, 
since such a choice can only be evaluated in the context of the wider gendering and 
polarisation of the UK public sphere.8  Our point rather is that there is little evidence for 
some optimistic claims that this aspect of popular culture provides any potential routes 
into political culture, even in an expanded sense. If people’s engagement with celebrity 
culture is part of a turning away from concern with issues that require public resolution 
(away from, in our definition, ‘public connection’), then no amount of well-crafted 
messages will make a difference.  
The result is to understand better how the ‘culture’ of citizenship (if there is one: Couldry 
2006) works. It is here that we connect with an interesting recent argument (Turner 2006) 
about the problematic relation between celebrity culture’s ‘demotic turn’ and actual 
prospects for democratic renewal and political and social change. While our concern has 
not been to comment on the actual content of celebrity culture (what Turner calls an 
‘ideological system without an ideological project’) but rather how it is put to work in 
people’s own picture of the public world, our diary evidence points suggests considerable 
reservations about celebrity culture among audiences themselves, and so points in a 
 26
similar direction to Turner, if via a different route. Rather than neglect this conclusion as 
inconvenient, it is important, if (as Dahlgren (2006) suggests) cultural studies is to 
contribute to current debates about democracy, to recognise that popular culture is not 
always the bridge to effective and expanded democracy that we would like it to be.  
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Figure and Tables 
 
 
Table 1: The top five themes people keep up with, by cluster (Percentage of 
respondents who named issue, N=1006) 
Rank order (freq) ‘Traditional’ ‘Issues’ ‘Celebrity’ ‘Low Interest’ 
1 Economy 89% Environment 78% Big Brother 80% Health 45% 
2 Environment 86% Health 64% Celebrity 79% Sports 38% 
3 Crime 85% Crime 63% Health 61% Crime 35% 
4 Iraq 85% Poverty 59% Fashion 61% Environment 33% 
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5 Europe 82% Iraq 57% Iraq 58% Iraq 16% 
% who named <2 issues 0% 4.9% 4.8% 38.6% 
  
 
 
Table 2: Social capital (Percentage who agree or strongly agree, N=1006) 
 
 Celebrity Traditional Single-Issue Low Interest 
You play an active role in local, political or voluntary 
organizations 
8 34 16 12 
Most of your friends live nearby 70 56 63 65 
Being involved in your neighbourhood is important 
to you 
57 69 57 60 
You are involved in voluntary work 16 33 25 26 
You feel that you can influence decisions in your 
area 
32 48 36 26 
You can affect things by getting involved in issues 
you care about 
67 78 64 51 
Differences between clusters significant (ANOVA) at p<0.01 unless indicated as not significant (n.s.) 
Table 3: Proportions of respondents by cluster who named an issue when asked, 
and, of those who did, the proportion who took any sort of related action. 
 ‘Traditional’ ‘Issues’ ‘Celebrity’ ‘Low interest’ 
% who name an issue 83 72 57 53 
% of these who name a related action 68 63 47 35 
Differences between clusters significant (ANOVA) at p<0.01 unless indicated as not significant (n.s.) 
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Table 4: Political engagement (Percentage who agree or strongly agree, N=1006) 
 
 Celebrity Traditional Single-Issue Low Interest 
You generally vote in national elections 65 92 78 75 
You are generally interested in what’s going on in 
politics 
40 88 60 30 
You don’t get involved in political protests 59 (n.s.) 63 (n.s.) 62 (n.s.) 51 (n.s.) 
You don’t like to discuss politics with other people 43 (n.s.) 39 (n.s.) 42 (n.s.) 45 (n.s.) 
People like us have no say in what the government 
does 
60 50 56 69 
Politics has little connection to your life 63 36 50 53 
You have a good understanding of the main issues 
facing our country 
62 94 78 65 
It doesn’t really matter which party is in power, in 
the end things pretty much go on the same 
60 43 61 73 
Sometimes politics seems so complicated that you 
can’t really understand what’s going on 
82 49 64 69 
Differences between clusters significant (ANOVA) at p<0.01 unless indicated as not significant (n.s.) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: News engagement (Percentage who agree or strongly agree, N=1006) 
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 Celebrity Traditional Single-Issue Low Interest 
Your friends would expect you to know what’s 
going on in the world 
49 78 66 48 
It’s your duty to keep up with what’s going on in the 
world 
56 81 71 43 
The things the media cover have little to do with 
your life 
40 36 42 49 
Different sources of news tend to give different 
accounts of what’s going on 
82 (n.s.) 86 (n.s.) 76 (n.s.) 72 (n.s.) 
You generally compare the news on different 
channels, newspapers or websites 
50 74 54 36 
You often feel that there’s too much media, so you 
have to turn off 
66* 67* 75* 75* 
It’s a regular part of your day to catch up with the 
news 
73 81 77 59 
You follow the news to know what other people are 
talking about 
71 84 73 64 
Differences between clusters significant (ANOVA) at p<0.01 unless indicated as significant at p<0.05(*) or 
indicated as not significant (n.s.) 
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1
 Recent debates on the general decline in trust in UK institutions (Toynbee 2005, 
discussing private MORI research) only echo longer-term research on ‘the erosion of 
institutional legitimacy’ in many countries (Inglehart, 1997) 
2
 Thanks to our colleague Sonia Livingstone for many discussions on the themes of this 
article. 
3
 We gratefully acknowledge support [details omitted for anonymity]: for fuller 
discussion of the project see Couldry, Livingstone and Markham (2007) and  
www.publicconnection.org .  
4
 See Couldry, Livingstone and Markham (2007, chapter 1) for details. 
5
 For a call for political research to be opened out in this way, see LeBlanc (1999) and for 
a defence of the contribution of self-produced data in media research, see Bird (2003). 
6
 See Holmes (2005).  
7
 Only one quote (from Janet, already given in part) hints otherwise, and it is still 
generalised: ‘perhaps I’ll bring in my Heat magazine [to the office] and one of the lads 
will pick it up and be like “Whoah that's Kylie Minogue” and it will branch off into “Oh 
look she’s getting married” . . . and then the whole office gets into a discussion about it, 
we have some quite good discussions at work really about the press and media’ (Janet). 
8
 For a parallel argument on women’s justified disengagement from traditional politics in 
Japan, Leblanc (1999). 
